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Background: Civil wars are characterized by intense forms of violence, such as torture, maiming and rape. Political
scientists suggest that this form of political violence is fostered through the provision of particular intrinsic and
extrinsic rewards to combatants. In the field of psychology, the perpetration of this kind of cruelty is observed to be
positively linked to appetitive aggression. Over time, combatants start to enjoy the fights and even the perpetration
of atrocities. In this study, we examine how receiving rewards (intrinsic versus extrinsic) influence the level of
appetitive aggression exhibited by former combatants.
Method: We surveyed 95 former combatants in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Results: Linear regression analyses reveal that intrinsic as well as extrinsic rewards are linked to the former
combatants’ Appetitive Aggression score. However, this relationship is partly determined by the way in which
combatants are recruited: While abducted combatants seem to react more strongly to extrinsic rewards, the score
of those that joined voluntarily is primarily determined by intrinsic rewards.
Conclusions: We conclude that receiving rewards influence the level of appetitive aggression. However, which
type of rewards (intrinsic versus extrinsic) is of most importance is determined by the way combatants are
recruited.
Keywords: Extrinsic rewards, Intrinsic rewards, Appetitive aggression, Democratic Republic of the CongoBackground
Armed conflicts are characterized by severe cruelty.
Combatants and civilians are not only killed in battles
but in many instances the killing is accompanied by
gruesome acts like torture, rape, or cutting ears, lips,
breasts, and throats. This form of cruelty is a well-
known phenomenon in conflict zones around the world
[1]. It is mostly understood as a result of military weak-
ness of the perpetrator [2], forms of military strategy to
intimidate the enemy [3] measures to destroy the sup-
port base of the opposing party [4], and personal reasons
such as rage [5]. Researchers, however, rarely take* Correspondence: Roos.vanderHaer@uni-konstanz.de
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reproduction in any medium, provided the oranother perspective and examine these occurrences on
the psychological level, by focusing on the underlying
motivation of human aggression [6,7].
Aggressive behavior may be motivated by two quite
different emotional conditions, opposite in valence: (1)
The reactive aggression is elicited to fight off threat and
danger, it serves to reduce aversive emotional arousal,
such as anger or fear. (2) The appetitive form of aggres-
sion is rewarding in itself, it is perceived as appealing
during the act of violence [8,9] and thus can sustain
itself in a cycle of positive feedback. Previous authors
have acknowledged that cruelty may be rooted in instru-
mental mechanisms of aggression [10] however, they have
assumed that it is prompted by its anticipated benefits like
in mating [11,12], status [13,14], or access to resources
[15,16]. This seems as much of a misconception asd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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reproduction: Just as sexual acts can be enjoyable in them-
selves, so can acts of aggression. All too often, the bio-
logically intrinsic joy of attacking and hunting is ignored
by scholars when trying to explain the occurrence of vio-
lent acts although every culture has forms to live and
enjoy appetitive aggression, such as boxing, gladiator
fights or aggressive computer games.
Psychologists working in the field of civil war research
have recently suggested that humans may develop high
levels of appetitive aggression if they are exposed to vio-
lent settings in which the perpetration of violence is not
only necessary to survive but perceived as rewarding and
beneficial [17]. In samples with genocide perpetrators
from Rwanda [18] and child soldiers from Uganda [19]
appetitive aggression was related positively to commit-
ting violent acts and negatively correlated to developing
the Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Notwithstand-
ing, most of these studies, with perhaps the exception of
Hecker et al. [20], have linked appetitive aggression to vari-
ous psychological factors. However war, torture, and other
severe cruel human right violations cannot only be under-
stood on the individual level, but must also be considered
on the societal and structural level, i.e., as a problem in pol-
itics or micro politics [21]. It is then also important to be
aware of the political context in order to comprehend the
meaning of organized violence for the individual and the
community. This impairs not only the mental health and
daily functioning on an individual level, but also compro-
mises the reconstruction and development of society
[21-24]. In order to fill this scientific niche, we will empir-
ically investigate the influence of some identified micro
political factors on the variation in appetitive aggression in
a sample of former Congolese recruits from different
armed groups in eastern provinces of the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (DRC). This country is in a state of
chaos and disintegration ever since its independence in
1960. The conflict is mainly about the control over natural
resources (especially present in the eastern part) but it has
also an ethnical component attached to it. It is even further
complicated by the fact that some armed groups fighting
the government troops, like the Rassemblement Congolais
pour la Démocratie and the Forces Démocratiques de la
Libération du Rwanda are supported by foreign states like
Rwanda and Uganda. In the past decade, several new
groups have emerged while others merge together. Offi-
cially a peace agreement was signed in 2003 and the United
Nations was authorized to deploy peacekeepers. Although
the presence of these peacekeepers has improved the situ-
ation in Congo considerable [25], the country is still faced
with major challenges, among others, still active rebel
groups raiding villages and committing severe human right
abuses in combination with economic debt, inflation, un-
employment, diseases, natural disasters and refugee flows.In examining the influence of some identified micro
political factors on the level of appetitive aggression in
former Congolese combatants, we will focus on the role
of rewards in motivating combatants for participation in
armed groups – an issue that has evolved as a dominant
theme in conflict research in the last decade [26-28].
This literature generally identifies two different types of
rewards that can be granted to new recruits: The more
evident ones are pecuniary or extrinsic rewards, which
are those received benefits that are visible to others [29].
In industrial organizations, such rewards are distributed
in the form of bonuses, raises or paid vacations. In
armed groups, extrinsic rewards do not only take the
form of money but also of food and/or recreational
drugs such as alcohol or weapons. Besides extrinsic re-
munerations, people can also be motivated by non-
pecuniary or intrinsic rewards, which are non-tangible
incentives. While many types of “intrinsic” rewards refer
to the individual such as self-determination, task in-
volvement, curiosity, enjoyment and interest [30], the
focus for military groups lies more on the collective than
on the individual [31]. In armed units, intrinsic rewards
come among others in the form of solidarity and attach-
ment to the unit and fellow comrades [32]. Although the
economic literature on the effect of rewards is reluctant
to accept the power of these intrinsic soft rewards, espe-
cially social scientists examining the influence of social
relationships and bonds in military groups, have ac-
knowledged the power of these returns. Wong et al. [33]
for example find that the strength of interpersonal bond
between soldiers is a critical factor for combat motiv-
ation. Even though MacCoun et al. [34] dispute this
finding that social bonds increase combat effectiveness,
they also agree that “social bonds are profoundly import-
ant in soldiers’ lives”. The power of intrinsic rewards is
then also important for other political spheres. Opp [35]
for example finds that intrinsic rewards are major deter-
minants for participation in protesting movements.
It is thereby acknowledged that rewards in general can
foster specific types of behavior, including the perpetration
of violent and aggressive acts, if this is the desired and
promoted behavior [36]. While in civil society, violent be-
havior is often punished rather than promoted (and as
such rewards work in the opposite directions), military
groups need to endorse cruel actions. Humphreys and
Weinstein [37] provide some first evidence that specific
rewards may be related to military violence. On the basis
of a large survey of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, the au-
thors argue that armed groups using more pecuniary re-
wards for attracting recruits are more engaged in higher
levels of killings. In light of these results, we postulate in
this study that the nature of rewards might have a signifi-
cant influence on the level of appetitive aggression of indi-
vidual combatants.
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Participants
We interviewed 95 former members of different Congo-
lese armed forces. These members were selected on the
basis of a convenience sample. 94 participants completed
the interview, only one indicated that he was too tired to
finish the entire set of questions. Most of the partici-
pants had joined armed groups on a voluntarily basis
(64%) (see also Table 1 for more descriptive statistics).
The age of these former combatants ranged between 14
and 49 years (mean (M) = 21.47 years, standard devi-
ation (SD) = 7.07 years). Only 5 participants were
female. Of the 95 participants, 24 former combatants
came from the province North Kivu and 61 from South
Kivu. The other participants originated from other parts
of the Congo or from other countries in eastern Africa.
Unsurprisingly, more than half of the respondents had
only a few years primary school and only 2 former com-
batants indicated to have a university degree. 57% had
no job at the time of the interview.
In the sample we interviewed, several combatants indi-
cated that they were more than once recruited into an
armed organization (M = 1.67, SD = 0.80 groups, min = 1
and max = 4). Each of them was interviewed about his or
her experience in every armed group in which he or she
was involved.a Of the participants, 32% interviewees were
involved in one of the many different Mayi Mayi factions
(a traditional community based Congolese militia group),
16% were involved in the Rassemblement Congolais pour
la Démocratie (an armed group supported by Rwanda and
Uganda), 10% were involved in the Les Forces Armées de
la République Démocratique du Congo (the national army
of the DRC), 8% were active in the L’Alliance des Forces
Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (the armed
group that overthrew Mobutu in 1997), 6% belonged to
the Patriotes Resistants Congolais (a Congolese militia –
closely related to the Mayi Mayi), another 6% were a
member of Le Congrès National pour la Défense duTable 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Recruitment method Mean St. Dev. Min Max
AAS scores Voluntarily 27.13 8.16 11 52
Abducted 25.19 7.49 15 48
Closeness Voluntarily 2.83 1.23 1 5
Abducted 2.11 0.92 1 5
Money Voluntarily 0.27 0.45 0 1
Abducted 0.24 0.43 0 1
Duration (years) Voluntarily 2.38 2.02 0 10
Abducted 2.85 2.49 0 12
Combat actions Voluntarily 147.11 425.38 0 2920
Abducted 167.87 370.92 0 1460Peuple (an armed group composed of mainly Tutsis fight-
ing Congolose and Rwanda Hutu forces), 4% were active
in the Forces Démocratiques de la Libération du Rwanda
or the Interahamwe (an armed group primarily composed
of abducted Congolese and former Rwandan Hutus that
were active in planning and executing the genocide in
Rwanda in 1994), and 3 other participants were unable to
identify their armed group or were active in minor or
unknown groups. See Prunier [38] for a more detailed
description of the armed groups.Procedure
The semi-structured interview that forms the basis of
this study was developed in collaboration with an inter-
disciplinary team consisting of political scientists and
clinical psychologists with extensive experience in
psychotraumatology from the University of Konstanz
and the non-governmental organization (NGO) vivo
international.b The survey was conducted between
March and May 2009 after pre-testing and receiving the
permission of the ethics boards of the university. Most
of the interviews took place in Bukavu, the capital of the
Eastern DRC province South Kivu. Other interviews
were held in Bunyakiri, a place in the same province
where often battles between the major parties occur.
The majority of the semi-structured interviews were
conducted at three welcome centers, which provide shel-
ter and elementary help for those combatants that are
released, escaped or have been demobilized by different
NGOs. All ex-combatants were offered participation and
no one refused. Additionally, other former combatants
were traced with the help of these centers and
interviewed at their working place (20% of the sample).
We interviewed all former combatants of two welcome
centers, and some others from the third center.
In all settings, we assured as much confidentiality
as possible: In the centers, the conversations were
carried out in separate rooms with no attendance of
any welcome center staff. At their working space,
the interviews were carried out in discrete spaces to
grant as much privacy as possible. Before the inter-
view took place, participants were carefully informed
about the purpose of this study and about their priv-
acy and confidentiality rights. Informed consent was
provided by a document that was signed by all
people that were present during the interview (the
participant, the researcher, and the translator), in
which it was described that all the information given
would be only used for scientific purposes and that
the participant could stop the interview at any point
of time. It was emphasized that the participant could
always refuse to answer a question. Very import-
antly, we always explained carefully that participation
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pensation or benefit.
Most of the interviews were carried out by two of the
authors (RH and LB) while the third author (TE) carried
out the pre-testing together with two locally experienced
female researchers (who in addition to English and French
also spoke either Swahili or Kinyarwanda and thus were
able to control the translation). Interviews were in English
and translated in the spoken language of the participant
(Swahili, Kinyarwanda, or Lingala) by locally trained fe-
male or male translators. Additional conversations were
also held in French, in cases where the respondent spoke
this language. Before the interviewers were conducted, the
translators received a training in which the researchers
explained the purpose of each question. Translation issues
were discussed during the training in order to avoid con-
fusing during the interviews.
Measures
Appetitive aggression scale
We assessed a person’s propensity towards perpetrating
aggressive acts using the Appetitive Aggression Scale
(AAS; Weierstall and Elbert [9]), a semi-structured inter-
view for the assessment of a person’s propensity towards
violence that has been validated with over 1.600 ex-
combatants (including Rwandan genocide perpetrators
and Ugandan child soldiers). Not only has the scale pro-
vided a valid assessment of a participant’s propensity to-
wards violence, it has also been proven to have good
psychometric properties [19]. The scale consists of 15
items, which has a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.85.c Since its
publication, the AAS has been used in several other
studies [20,39]. For each item, a statement regarding the
appetitive perception of aggressive behaviour and man-
hunt was given and the participant had to decide how
much he or she agreed with the statement. We asked
them for example, to what extent he or she agreed with
the statement “I get sexually aroused for killing people”
or “I like to listen to people telling me stories about how
they have killed others”. Responses were coded on a
five-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (“I totally dis-
agree”) to 4 (“I totally agree”). For the analyses the sum
score was calculated. The total AAS score from the par-
ticipants ranges from 11 to 52 points. See Table 1 for more
descriptive statistics. The score of those participants that
voluntarily joined the armed group range also from 11
and 52 with an average of 27.13 and a standard deviation
of 8.16. The scores of abductees were somewhat smaller
(M = 25.19, SD = 7.49, min = 15 and max = 48).
Intrinsic rewards
Because of their less visible quality, intrinsic rewards are
difficult to measure. Generally, combatants who value
their membership in the armed group and for whomcohesion, unity and comradry is important, should feel
more intrinsically motivated to fulfill their tasks within
the group and at the same time feel rewarded if the
group acknowledges their actions. Conversely, combat-
ants who do not feel attached to the armed group will
not be intrinsically motivated to follow orders. For them,
economic compensation, physical threat, or pressure will
be the most important motivators for engaging in combat
and for the perpetration of acts of violence. As a measure
for intrinsic rewards, we assessed whether the combatant
agree or disagreed with the statement that he or she feels
still close to his or her former comrades in the group. This
measure ranged from 1 (“I strongly disagree”) to 5 (“I
strongly agree”) (M = 2.55, SD = 1.17).
Extrinsic rewards
Economic compensations, for example, in the form of
extra payments or bonuses are common extrinsic re-
wards to foster and recompense a desired behavior. In
organizations, extrinsic rewards are understood as re-
wards “provided by the organization for the purpose of
facilitating or motivating task performance” [29]. As a
measure for extrinsic rewards, we assessed whether the
combatant ever received money for participating in fight-
ing. On the basis of this question, we constructed a di-
chotomous variable (M = 0.26, SD = 0.44). See Table 1
for more descriptive statistics of this measure.
Duration
As the duration spend in the armed group could be a
potential predictor for the development of appetitive ag-
gression, we assessed the duration in years. This rests on
the assumption that long exposures to violent stricken
environments impact the personal behavior as individ-
uals adapt to the hostile surrounding. This measure
ranged from 0 to 12 years (M = 2.55 years, SD = 2.20)
(Mabductees = 2.85 years, SDabductees = 2.49; Mvoluntarily =
2.38 years, SDvoluntarily = 2.02).
Number of combat actions
In concurrence with a cycle of violence theory and our
previous results [40], it is hypothesized that those partic-
ipants who have a higher propensity towards violence
also engage in more combat actions, while in a loop this
also fosters appetitive aggression. To control for this
possible effect, we assessed the number of self-reported
combat actions, i.e. we asked the participants how often
they were involved in fighting. If they could not remem-
ber the exact number, we asked them to estimate the
amount of fighting events that they were involved in an
average week. On the basis of these questions we
made a simple additive index ranging from 0 to 2920
(M = 154, SD = 405) for all participants (Mabductees =
167.87, SDabductees = 370.92; Mvoluntarily = 147.11,
Table 3 Regression of AAS score, predictors, and
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measure is subjective in the sense that it describes more
the participant’s feeling on how often he or she was in-
volved in fighting rather than the real number.
Results
We used linear regression analysis to explore the associ-
ation between these micro political variables and the
propensity of appetitive violence. The statistical model-
ing and regression analysis was carried out with Stata
version 11 and R version 2.15.1. We used the Akaike In-
formation Criteria (AIC) to estimate the best model fit
[41,42]. For the AIC, all possible competing forced entry
regressions models are ranked according to their AIC,
with the one having the lowest AIC being the best fit-
ting, as the loss of information based on this model is
the smallest. As the Variance Inflammation Factor (VIF)
did not exceed (1.48) in all models, multicollinearity can
be neglected.
The selected models are presented in Table 2. They in-
clude all of the predictors: closeness as intrinsic rewards,
money as extrinsic rewards, duration, the number of
self-reported combat actions, and the age of joining vol-
untarily or of abduction. In the first model information
of all participants (those that are abducted and those
that joined voluntarily) was included. However, some of
the former combatants did not answer all questions, and
were removed from the analysis. This model reveals that
closeness (coeff. of 2.25, p <.001) and money (coeff. of
4.29, p <.01) are strong predictors for the AAS score.
There is also a strong positive relation between the
number of self-reported combat actions and the AAS
score. The effect of the amount of time spent in the
armed group are both not statistical reliable.
To further examine this result, we performed two add-
itional linear regression analyses for two sub-groups of
combatants: One for participants that were abducted







Constant 18.04*** (1.98) 22.15*** (6.401) 14.44*** (2.75)
Closeness 2.25*** (0.68) −1.99 (2.518) 3.43*** (0.85)
Money 4.29** (1.78) 8.10*** (2.80) 0.83 (2.33)
Duration (years) −0.13 (0.32) 0.17 (0.45) 0.25 (0.50)
Combat actions 0.01** (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01** (0.01)
N 78 29 49
R2 0.26 0.44 0.32
Radj
2 0.22 0.34 0.26
Note: coefficients are standardized; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<.001,
** p<.01, * p<.05.voluntarily (Model 3). We deemed these additional tests
necessary because we found indications in previous re-
search that although appetitive aggression is present at
least to some degree in both the abducted and the non-
abducted group, it is more substantial in the latter
group. In the two models, one can see that in both sub-
groups, intrinsic and extrinsic rewards play different
roles. For abductees, those who received money as a
reward during their time in the armed group exhibited a
higher level of appetitive aggression (coeff. of 8.10, p <.05).
For those participants that joined on a voluntarily basis, it
is an especially intrinsic reward, as the closeness that the
participant feels towards his or her fellow combatants,
determines their AAS score (coeff. of 3.43, p <.001).
In order to draw conclusion and to test whether there
is indeed a significant difference between the coefficients
of those that joined on a voluntarily basis and those that
were abducted, we calculated another model, with all
predictors of the AAS score including two additional in-
teractions: closeness * recruitment method and money *
recruitment method. The results are presented in Table 3
(Radj
2 = .29).
As can be seen from the table, both included inter-
action effects are significant predictors for the AAS
score. The AAS score of abductees is more related to
the extrinsic reward of money rather than the scores of
those that joined the armed groups voluntarily (the coef-
ficient is positive and significant). At the same time, the
AAS score of the latter group is correlated with the
intrinsic reward of feeling close and bonding with their
fellow comrades (the coefficient is negative, p<.01).
Discussion
If we want to understand the roots of genocide and mass
killing, and the cruel violent actions that take place dur-
ing these episodes, we need to look at the interplayinteraction effects
Variable Β Std. Err. p
Constant 25.07 4.02 ***
Money 7.18 3.10 **
Closeness −2.20 2.10
Recruitment −9.98 5.02 *
Closeness * Recruitment 5.50 2.25 **
Money * Recruitment −6.43 3.80 *
Duration (years) 0.22 0.35





Note: coefficients are standardized; *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05.
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national relations (political science) and the proposed at-
traction to and appetite for cruelty as is described in the
field of psychology, as societal problems often provide a
starting point for the outbreak of group violence [43].
This study is one of the first to bridge this gap by exam-
ining the relationship between rewarding (and its nature)
and the appetitive effects of violence in humans. In
doing so, we have relied on theoretical arguments put
forth by scholars in international relations. Empirically,
we examined this linkage with a sample of former com-
batants in the DRC. The AAS [9] assesses the extent of
appetitive experience with the perpetration of violence
or the infliction of harm that is aimed at a victim so the
perpetrator experiences violent-related enjoyment by the
exposure to violence cues such as the screaming and
bleeding of the victim. Rewards, in turn were assessed
with the question of whether the former combatant
received money and whether he or she felt close to his
or her former comrades.
The results indicate a significant and robust relation-
ship between rewards and appetitive aggression. Add-
itionally, we found that this relationship differs by
method of recruitment. There was a stronger relation-
ship between extrinsic (money) rewards and the AAS
score for former abductees than for those that joined the
armed group on a voluntary basis. At the same time, the
AAS score of the voluntary joiners was determined by
intrinsic rewards.
It is highly likely that this difference stems from their
initial motivation and social position. Humphrey and
Weinstein [44] find in their study about the functioning of
armed groups in Sierra Leone that voluntary recruits stem
largely from politically alienated social groups while
abductees come from those groups that endure the most
economic difficulties. It is then not surprising that
fighters, who were forced to fight against their will, are
less likely to establish bonds with other combatants as
they do not share common goals. Coming mostly from
poor backgrounds, however, even abducted combatants
seem to be receptive to economic compensation as this
type of reward seems to establish positive feelings towards
the designated task of killing and harming. Voluntary
members, on the other hand joined for a cause and are
more likely to share common goals or ideologies with
their comrades. This of course leads to a natural cohesion
and vicinity within the ranks of the armed group. Even
though combatants can also join voluntarily for economic
reasons, for them, social recognition proves to be an im-
portant reward for their actions. In light of these findings
we observe that extrinsic as well as intrinsic rewards can
foster positive feelings towards aggression – which, in the
anarchy like environment of the DRC results in the
perpetration of horrible acts of cruelty.However, it is important to note that this study has fo-
cused on one kind of extrinsic reward and one kind of
intrinsic reward, money and social group bonding. Fur-
ther studies are required to investigate the relationship
between other examples of rewards and the AAS score.
Additionally, it should be noted that the observed rela-
tionships between rewards and appetitive aggression is
one of correlational nature, i.e. appetitive aggression
might also for example determine whether an abductee
receive money or not. The analyses also show that the
duration of time spent in the armed group has no effect
on the AAS score of the former combatant. Hecker et al.
found similar results [20]. The number of self-reported
combat actions is in contrast to duration, positively re-
lated to appetitive aggression, which also coincided with
previous research [18].
Limitations
This study provides first evidence of how received re-
wards relate to the AAS score. Notwithstanding, an im-
portant limitation is that we collected the data
retrospectively. However, the exact nature of this bias is
unknown. Furthermore, it can be assumed that those
combatants who have a high amount of appetitive ag-
gression are still eagerly involved in man hunting activ-
ities and thus unlikely to return to civil society and show
up in our convenience sample. Additionally, it might be
likely that armed groups select the more aggressive
members in the first place. Future research, should then
not only investigate to which extent this result can be
generalized to different populations, but whether the
identified relationships hold in larger samples. In
addition, it might be interesting to investigate if there
are particular group influences. Currently, we are unable
to test specific group influences due to the uneven dis-
tribution of former combatants across the armed groups.
Conclusions
The present investigation indicates the importance of
theoretically combining insights of conflict studies (pol-
itical science) and psychology. In doing so, we examined
the relationship between receiving rewards and the level
of appetitive aggression in former combatants. Empiric-
ally, this study shows that extrinsic rewards play an im-
portant role in predicting former abductees’ level of
appetitive aggression, while intrinsic rewards have more
influence on the AAS score of those combatants that
joined on a voluntary basis.
Endnotes
a Some former combatants were recruited more than
once by an armed group. These particular combatants
answered the set of questions for each time they were
recruited and consequently were more often used in the
Haer et al. Conflict and Health 2013, 7:11 Page 7 of 8
http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/7/1/11analysis. This might result in a bias, since observations
are no longer independent. Consequently, we clustered
the standard errors per individual across every model to
confirm the robustness of our models. No significant
changes could be identified between the clustered and
unclustered models.
b See for more information: www.vivo.org.
c See Weierstall and Elbert [19] for more detailed
information on the construction of the AAS.
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